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H I G H L I G H T S  
 
 Demand flexibility can be used to defer physical network expansions. 
 Through the proposed model, FlexMart, consumers can offer their flexibility for a fixed, 
riskless benefit. 
 Through FlexMart, the DSO can reduce its total costs by using the available flexibility to 
relieve the network from congestion events.  
 Regulation on energy markets and pricing can be a catalyzer for flexibility to become a 
success story. 
 
A B S T R A C T  
 
The volumes of intermittent renewable energy sources (RES) and electric vehicles (EVs) are 
increasing in grids across Europe. Undoubtedly, the distribution networks cope with congestion 
issues much more often due to distributed generation and increased network use.  Such issues 
are often handled by unit re-dispatching in short term and grid expansion in long term. Re-
dispatching is, however, not always an appropriate solution for local distribution networks since 
the limited generation units are mostly RES of uncontrollable volatility. Recovering the incurred 
investment costs on the other hand would trigger an increase of the network tariffs. A possible 
solution is todefer such an investment by utilizing the demand side resources. The FlexMart 
model, developed and suggested in this paper, provides the ability for the Distribution System 
Operator (DSO) to purchase demand flexibility offered by residential consumers. Two feeders 
with different topologies are tested and the ability of the suggested mechanism to provide 
benefits for the involved stakeholders, both the DSO and the consumers, is demonstrated. The 
developed empirical model, works as a long-term planning tool and has the ability to provide an 
optimal combination of physical expansions and flexibility dispatch to reassure the stable and 
secure operation of the grid. 
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Nomenclature 
 
𝑛 Node 
𝑡 Time 
𝑙 Line 
𝑇𝐶 Total Cost [€] 
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𝑐𝑒𝑥𝑝  Expansions costs [€]  
𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑡  Curtailment costs [€] 
𝐶𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥  Flexibility costs [€] 
𝐶𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒  Expansion cost per unit [€/kW] 
𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙  Volume of expansion [kW] 
𝑃𝑡  Price [€/kWh] 
𝑄𝑡
𝐷𝑛 Power demand [kW] 
𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑛  Optimal demand after flexibility dispatch [kW] 
𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛  Volume of down-regulated demand [kW] 
𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑛  Volume of up-regulated demand [kW] 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 𝑛 Investment cost for flexibility [€] 
𝑅𝑂𝐼 Return on investment rate [.00] 
𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑛,𝑡  Volume of curtailed power [kW] 
𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑡 Volume of power imported through the feeder [kW] 
𝑃𝑉𝑛,𝑡 Output power of PV [kW] 
𝑓𝑙,𝑡  Power flow [kW] 
𝐶𝐴𝑃𝑙  Line capacity [kW] 
𝐵𝑃 Base Power [kVA] 
𝜃𝑛𝑖  Power angle [o] 
𝑍𝑙  Line impedance [Ω] 
𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥  Flexibility coefficient [.00] 
 
 
Abbreviations 
 
RES Renewable Energy Sources 
DSO Distribution System Operator 
EV Electric Vehicle 
ROI Return on Investment 
GHG Green House Gases  
SO System Operator  
CAPEX Capital Expenditure 
OPEX Operational Expenditure 
LV/MV/HV Low/Medium/High Voltage 
NPV Net Present Value 
MP Market Power 
TSO Transmission System Operator 
IB Incentive-Based 
PB Price-Based 
DR Demand Response 
LINEAR Local Intelligent Networks and Energy Active Regions 
FLECH FLExibility Clearing House 
BRP Balancing Responsible Party 
GRASP Greedy Randomized Adaptive Search Procedure 
CHA Constructive Heuristic Algorithm 
MILP Mixed Integer Linear Programming 
AU Aggregating Unit 
PV PhotoVoltaic 
KPI Key Performance Indicator 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 Flexibility can be defined as the ability of a power system to utilize its resources to respond 
to changes in net load (Lannoye, 2012). Demand side flexibility refers to the part of the load 
which is shiftable without violating comfort standards of the consumers (Tahersima, Madsen, & 
Andersen, 2013). Flexibility can be part of efficient strategies, such as to facilitate the integration 
of intermittent RES to the grids (Heussen, Koch, Ulbig, & Andersson, 2012). Moreover, the need 
to integrate more RES to the grids is continuously increasing, in an attempt to transition to a 
sustainable, cleaner power system. From a European point of view, the commonly adopted 20-
20-20 goals described on the “3rd package” (European Commission, 2009), foresee a turn 
towards renewable resources in order to minimize CO2 and emissions of greenhouse gasses 
(GHG). The intermittent nature of these resources causes several issues, not only from a 
technical perspective but from an economic one likewise.  
 For the sake of consumers’ comfort, the grids must have adequate capacity to provide the 
connected users with high-quality uninterrupted power under any circumstances. However, the 
uncontrollability of the output level of RES increases the occurrences of congestion problems in 
the distribution grids. Investing in grid facilities, i.e. power lines, feeders and substations, is 
capital intensive. Moreover, considering the fact that these additional investments are utilized 
when load is peaked and hence only for some hours per year, the question which arises is if such 
an approach is actually efficient. The implementation of such a solution however becomes more 
difficult due to the increasing share of intermittent RES integrating to the grids. Another option 
would be to use a market-oriented approach instead of physical expansions or re-dispatching. 
Traditionally, flexibility has been provided by the generation side through a re-dispatching of 
units and starting-up auxiliary units. . Existing technologies allow a “smart” communication 
between the different actors of the power system. Hence, a solution which utilizes the available 
demand side flexibility could possibly provide an alternative to physical expansions (Dansk 
Energi, 2012). 
 This paper assesses the possibility of mobilizing residential demand side resources in order 
to defer physical expansions in local distribution networks. In order to empower consumers to 
offer their demand resources to the grid, specifically here to the DSO, the designation of an 
appropriate incentivizing mechanism is proposed. The incentives for the consumers come from 
either savings from price differences, i.e. shifting consumption from peak hours with high prices 
to lower priced hours; or by providing an adjusted fixed benefit. In this paper, flexibility is 
dispatched according to the needs of the DSO in order to minimize its required investments, 
while the flexibility remuneration mechanism is a combination of both approaches in order to 
limit the risks for consumers. The choice for such a regulated approach is motivated. A small 
local market can have a lot of capabilities and potential, however, it is assumed that it has 
limited liquidity. Consequently, market power can easily be concentrated and potentially 
exploited,  exposing the market participants to risk. More details on the proposed mechanism 
are provided in section 3. 
 The main contribution of this paper is the provision of a mechanism that valorizes fairly the 
demand flexibility resources, considering DSOs and consumers best interests alike. The 
methodology used consists of two directions. First, the development of a conceptual market 
model and second, the development of an empirical planning model using mixed integer linear 
programming (MILP) on the GAMS software system. The selection of this two-fold methodology, 
conceptual and empirical, is justified by the intention of the authors to conduct both qualitative 
and quantitative research on the topic. Following this introductory section, section 2 contains 
the literature review in the context of flexibility markets and recent projects. The proposed 
pricing structure and modeling are analyzed in section 3. Section 4 hosts the results obtained 
from the empirical model and a brief discussion on them, whilst section 5 serves a conclusive 
purpose. 
 
 
 
2. Literature review 
 
 Following the recent evolutions, distribution networks face various challenges. The 
continuously increasing penetration of the intermittent RES, the rising EV market and the fact 
that distribution grids were not designed to accommodate distributed generation add a lot of 
stress to the grid (Perez-Arriaga & Battle, 2012), (Cossent, Gomez, & Frias, 2009), (Van der Welle 
& de Joode, 2011). Despite its various benefits, distributed generation, RES and EVs might result 
in congestion issues (Pepermans, Driesen, Haeseldonckx, Belmans, & D'haeseleer, 2005), 
(Clement-Nyns, Haesen, & Driesen, 2010), (Schmutzler & Wietfeld, 2010) as well as policy 
implications (Joorde, Jansen, Welle, & Scheepers, 2009). Such issues hinder the stability of the 
system due to over-loading of the lines and may lead to involuntary load shedding, having hence 
a negative impact towards the security and reliability of the system (Papalexopoulos, 1997), 
(Hogan, 1997). Common approaches to relieve transmission networks include, among others, re-
dispatching of generators and making use of control devices (Nordel, 2000), (Christie, 
Wollenberg, & Wangstien, 2000). Units re-dispatching is not applicable to a distribution grid 
since its generating units are primarily RES, whose output level is not controllable. Hence, one of 
the problems that grid operators face is the need for incremental reinforcement of the grid 
(Joorde, Jansen, Welle, & Scheepers, 2009).  
 An approach to the distribution network investment planning would be to incorporate the 
DSO ratemaking regulation to the investment problem through utilization factors for the 
different network components, e.g. substations, lines, etc. (Giacomini, Santos, Neto, & Abaide, 
2013). Another methodology based on the PECO model (Román, Gómez, Muñoz, & Peco, 1999), 
proposes the use of the GIS data in order to expand the distribution grid alongside the road 
system and hence avoid infeasibilities and barriers (Domingo, Roman, Sanchez-Miralles, 
Gonzalez, & Martinez, 2011). The optimal siting and sizing of DERs in order to limit grid 
expansions is investigated in (El-Khattam, Hegazy, & A.Salama, 2005). In the same study it is 
shown that proper planning can reduce the expansion costs by about 20%.   
 It is, however, argued that DSOs might need to seek for innovative solutions beyond grid 
reinforcements and that flexibility is a rather important feature of the power system. (Perez-
Arriaga & Battle, 2012), (Bayod-Rujula, 2009), (Mendez, Rivier, Fuente, Arceluz, & Marin, 2006), 
(Cochran, et al., 2014), (Katz, 2014), (Ruester, Schwenen, Batlle, & Perez-Arriaga, 2014). The 
increasing penetration of intermittent RES decreases the supply side flexibility (Bosman, 2015), 
(Droste-Franke, et al., 2012). That creates a “flexibility gap”, which in turn should be covered to 
reassure reliability and security of the power system (Papaefthymiou, Grave, & Dragoon, 2014). 
From the demand side, flexibility can be provided by industrial and residential or commercial 
consumers. Industrial demand response is a mature technology. In several markets, industrial 
consumers provide already their demand resources through balancing markets and a lot of 
research has assessed its impacts and benefits (Bjork, 1989), (Flory, Peters, Vogt, Keating, & 
Hopkins, 1994), (Rahman & Rinaldy, 1993), (Roos, 1996). In the residential and commercial 
applications such as heating and cooling, there are possibilities to enable demand response. 
Additionally, rescheduling of washing activities in households might enhance those possibilities. 
Household demand response has a very high potential, however, it is still, not a mature 
technology (Papaefthymiou, Grave, & Dragoon, 2014).  
 It is needed to ensure that sufficient incentives are provided so that active load 
management on the demand side is a possibility (Cochran, et al., 2014), (Katz, 2014). Operations 
concerning flexibility provision, such as a demand down-regulation, should be explicitly 
rewarded through a designated market mechanism (Schmalensee, 2011). It is anticipated that 
flexibility contracting through a local market might be effective in deferring grid augmentations 
(Ramos, De Jonghe, Gomez, & Belmans, 2014). The necessity of a fair market that enables 
consumer participation, is open to the demand-side resources and enables well-managed 
payments and risks is evident (Actility, Anode, EnergyPool, & REstore, 2014). Aggregators can 
integrate the capabilities of small consumers and hence, allow them to participate in such a 
flexibility market (EURELECTRIC, 2014). Concerning the remuneration of the flexibility services  
a distinction is made between the incentive-based (IB) and the price-based (PB) schemes 
(Ramos, Jonghe, Six, & Belmans, 2013). In the former, the participants of such schemes are 
receiving a fixed benefit and their load is directly managed by operators when necessary. In the 
latter, consumers can participate through a pricing scheme and their benefit derives from 
consuming when the price is lower.  
 Summing up, it is identified that demand flexibility may defer incremental distribution grid 
expansions, however, this area has not yet been studied in detail. This paper, goes beyond the 
investigation of demand flexibility’s effects. The model developed in this paper, namely 
FlexMart, proposes a market mechanism and a remuneration scheme, that will be presented in 
the next section.  
 
 
3. Methodology 
 
 In order to tackle the objective of this paper, both a conceptual and an empirical model are 
developed. Through these models, the potential of the DSO to contract flexibility for deferring 
investments in grid assets is assessed. Following the literature review, the methods employed to 
solve the research question comprise of two directions. Firstly, the development of a conceptual 
market model and secondly, the development of an empirical planning model using mixed 
integer linear programing (MILP) on the GAMS software system. An overview of the 
methodology employed, from literature review to the interpretation of the empirical results, is 
illustrated in Fig. 1. 
 
 
Fig. 1. The methodology at a glance. 
 
3.1. Conceptual Model 
 
 A risk-free scheme that induces the minimum possible costs is desired and is proposed by 
FlexMart, a model developed for the purposes of this work. The aim is to create a ‘win-win’ 
situation for the involved stakeholders, namely, the DSO and the consumers. 
 In Fig. 2, the cost for accommodating a residual quantity of power, Qd (MW), with investing 
in grid assets, Ci (€), and with purchasing flexibility, Cf (€), are compared. The difference 
between investment and flexibility costs, creates a margin, Ci(Qd)-Cf(Qd), that depicts the gross 
incurred savings for the DSO when physical expansions are substituted by the use of demand 
flexibility. This margin can accommodate benefits for both the DSO and the flexibility providers, 
in this paper, the households. When these benefits are within the limit set by the margin, then 
both sides can enjoy gains. 
 In the next sections the dimensions of the FlexMart model are defined, its structure as well 
as the flows of services and benefits among its market players. As discussed earlier, in (Ramos, 
De Jonghe, Gomez, & Belmans, 2014), a flexibility market may be defined across four main 
dimensions, temporal, spatial, contractual and price-clearing. From the temporal point of view, 
the focus of the proposed market design 
is the long term. The main motivation for this focus derives from the fact that investment 
decision on grid assets can only be made in the long-run. On the other hand, it may be tricky to 
use very long time frames such as a 10-year period, because the accuracy of load forecasting can 
be questioned. In this paper a 3-year planning period is considered for the simulations.  
 From an economic point of view, it might be a preferred strategy to study locally only a 
fragment of the market, i.e. price zone, since it can be assumed without damaging the 
generalization that all players included are price takers and no quantity or price games can be 
played from their part. This assumption can be justified by the fact that the smaller the segment 
of a price zone, the smaller the market power that may be concentrated over the greater price 
zone. A distortion due to market power exercise would hamper our ability to arrive to unbiased 
results. Hence, alongside the spatial dimension, a local approach has been adopted.   
 
 
Fig. 2. Savings occurred by deferring investment in the physical network and using flexibility instead. 
 Considering the contractual aspect of the suggested market arrangement, the concept of 
aggregating unit (AU) is introduced. Residential users have a relatively low consumption and 
hence not enough to allow them participating in energy markets. Despite that, such an 
involvement would be rather time consuming for the consumers. An AU could allow them to 
participate in the market indirectly, by combining the capabilities of several consumers. This AU 
is assumed to be a non-profit intermediary for the purposes of this work. Profit masking by a 
commercial AU could have affected the estimation of an actual value and potential of flexibility 
which is investigated in this paper. To consider competing commercial AUs, an equilibrium 
model could be used to estimate the price of flexibility services offered to the DSOs; but this 
approach is not within the scope of the presented work.  In this paper, the research is focused on 
the relationship between DSO costs and the cost for investing in flexibility from the part of the 
consumers. 
 Considering the price clearing dimension, a regulated approach has been adopted. This 
approach offers the consumer a fixed benefit and thus eliminates the risk associated with price 
volatility. This benefit allows consumers to recover their investment in flexibility-associated 
equipment, i.e. advanced metering devices and control unites, incremented by a predefined 
return on investment (ROI) rate. The actual compensation for the consumer, Sn (€), is calculated 
as the fixed benefit minus the savings due to price differences, as seen in Eq.1: 
 
Sn = INVn ∙ (1 + ROI) − 𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛   Eq.1 
 
The scope, the participants and the flows of the FlexMart arrangement are illustrated in Fig. 3. 
Several residential consumers, i.e. households, are aggregated under the AU. For the purposes of 
clear illustration, only household n is depicted in Fig. 3. Household n offers its demand 
flexibility, Δdn (kW) to the AU. When necessary, this demand flexibility is utilized to serve the 
needs of the network. The resulting demand shifting will induce a difference in the electricity 
consumption rent, ΔP (€). To reassure that the flexible demand providers will secure a benefit 
by participating to FlexMart, a guaranteed benefit is provided to them. 
 
 
Fig. 3. Flows in the FlexMart mechanism. 
 
3.2. Empirical model and mathematical framework 
 
 According to the context of constrained optimization, a problem is described by an 
objective function to be maximized or minimized subject to a set of constraints.  The objective 
function is built step by step in a mathematical form. The constraints will also be discussed and 
their mathematical formulation will be given.         
 The formulation of the objective function is the DSO total cost function described by Eq. 2 
and its components by Eq. 3, Eq.5 and Eq.6. Components of the cost such as variable costs, 
commercial costs, invoicing et cetera, are not considered since they are irrespective to the 
flexibility versus investment decision, as they can be assumed to be the same in both cases. 
Apart from the cost of the incremental expansion of the lines, additional components need to be 
added. First, the DSO’s cost for contracting demand flexibility is comprised of the supplementary 
revenue to the consumers, S (€). Finally, solar installations have been considered in this network 
and hence the possibility of curtailing should be available to allow more controllability of the 
system output. Hence, the total cost that needs to be minimized can be expressed as set in Eq. 2. 
 
TC = 𝑐𝑒𝑥𝑝 + 𝑐𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥 + 𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑡   Eq. 2 
 
 According to Eq. 2, the DSO’s total cost consists of the expansion costs, cexp (€), the 
flexibility costs, cflex (€), and curtailment costs, ccurt (€). The curtailment costs have been added to 
the DSO’s total costs, since it has the chance to curtail the distributed generation if necessary to 
limit congestions in its grid. The cost for expanding the line l is given by Eq. 3 and it is equal to 
the the capacity to be incremented, kexp (kW), times the expansion costs per unit, Cline (€), where 
L is the set of all the lines belonging to the given network configuration. 
 
𝑐𝑒𝑥𝑝 = Cline ∙ ∑ 𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝ll∈L    Eq. 3 
 
 Before presenting the cost of the DSO for flexibility, it is important to demonstrate what is 
the price benefit and how is it calculated. Price benefit is a saving that occurs for the consumers 
by shifting their demand from high priced peak hours to low priced off-peak hours. The savings 
of a given flexible demand providing consumer n, due to price differences between the hours of 
power consumption before and after the demand shifting, are calculated based on Eq. 4, where 
Pt is the price at hour t, QtD is the power demand at hour t, qtDdown and qtDup represent the optimal 
demand decrease and the demand increase respectively. To construct the following equations, 
the Pt, wholesale price, is considered for the transactions among the DSO and the flexibility 
providing consumers. 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛 = ∑ (Pt ∙ Qt
Dn − Pt ∙ 𝑞𝑡
𝐷?̂?)t = ∑ {Pt ∙ Qt
Dn − Pt ∙ (Qt
Dn − 𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛 + 𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑛 )}t =
∑ {Pt ∙ (𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛 − 𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑛 )}t    Eq. 4                  
 
 Now, looking to the DSO, the cost to contract flexibility can be calculated according to Eq. 5. 
The DSO pays to the flexibility providing consumers their initial capital invested in flexibility-
related equipment, i.e. advanced metering devices, incremented by the predefined ROI rate, 
minus the savings that the consumers already made by the demand shifting, namely, their price 
benefit. (see Eq. 4). 
 
𝑐𝑓𝑙𝑒𝑥1 = ∑ ∑ [INVflexnt ∙ (1 + ROI) −n  𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒 𝐵𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑓𝑖𝑡𝑛   Eq. 5 
 
 
 Finally, the curtailment cost is assumed to be remunerated based on the spot price, Pt, 
multiplied by the volume of the curtailed power, as it is observed in Eq. 6.      
    
𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑡 = ∑ Pt ∙ 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑛,𝑡n,t    Eq. 1 
 
 Combining the above equations of the cost components, the objective function of the 
optimization problem is derived in Eq. 7. 
 
TC = Cline ∙ ∑ 𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝𝑙l∈L +
∑ ∑ [INVflexnt ∙ (1 + ROI) −n {Pt ∙ (𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛 − 𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑛)} + ∑ Pt ∙ 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑛,𝑡n,t
   Eq. 2 
 
 In Table 1, the cash flows described above are listed. The source, beneficiary and the 
corresponding unit price are listed alongside the cash flows.   
 
Table 1 
Cash flows, their source and beneficiaries and the price to determine them. 
 
Cash Flow Source Beneficiary Price per unit 
Cflex DSO Consumer INV*(1+ROI)-Price 
Benefit 
Price Benefitn Savings on market 
prices (ΔP) 
Consumer Pt 
Ccurt DSO Consumer Pt 
                                                          
1 Cflex is the cash flow from the viewpoint of the DSO. The same amount is referred to as Sn (supplementary 
payment) from the viewpoint of the consumers, since it is the amount they receive on top of their price 
benefit savings. 
Cexp DSO In-house/outsource 
construction cost 
Cline 
 
 The objective function is minimized subject to several constraints. The power balance 
constraint requires that the supplied power matches the amount of consumed power at all times 
and it is described by Eq. 8. In this study, the supply consists of the power imported to the 
feeder from the grid, the PV generation and its curtailment, and of the original demand adjusted 
by the up and down regulation. 
 
𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑡 + ∑ (PVn,t − 𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑡𝑛,𝑡)n = ∑ (Qt
Dn − 𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛 + 𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑛 )n , ∀t   Eq. 3 
 
 Concerning the imported power, pimp, and the capacity expansion, kexp, upper and lower 
limits are used to ensure that the variables are bounded. Eq. 9 and Eq. 10 contain the respective 
constraints that are added.   
 
Pimp ≤ 𝑝𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑡 ≤ Pimp, ∀t  Eq. 4 
Kexp ≤ 𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝l ≤ Kexp, ∀l ∈ L   Eq. 5 
 
 The optimization variable kexpl represents the incremental expansion of line l. The line flow 
fl,t is a function of the power injected into the network at that time, and is determined by solving 
the lossless DC power flow within the examined feeder. The power flow on each line l of the 
feeder is bounded according to Eq. 11, where CAPl represents the initial capacity of line l. 
 
𝑓𝑙,𝑡 ≤ |CAPl + 𝑘𝑒𝑥𝑝l| , ∀l ∈ L, ∀t   Eq. 6 
 
 Finally a set of constraints are also needed to model flexibility. First, for the purposes of this 
study, it has been assumed that flexibility is modelled as a percentage of the total consumption. 
This percentage is contained in the parameter COEFflex. Eq. 12 and Eq. 13 ensures that up- and 
down-regulations of the demand do not violate the flexibility coefficient. Second, a constraint is 
added to ensure that the demand is simply shifted and not curbed. For example, if at a time 
instance t1 the power consumption has to be decreased by 100 W, this has to be consumed later 
at an optimal time t2 within a predefined time frame that respects the comfort of the user. This 
time frame is configured by adjusting the ts, which is a subset of the time horizon. This 
functionality is ensure through introducing equation Eq. 14 to the constraints.  
 
𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛 ≤ COEFflex ∙ Qt
Dn , ∀n, t  Eq. 7 
𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑛 ≤ COEFflex ∙ Qt
Dn , ∀n, t   Eq. 8 
 
∑ {𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑑𝑜𝑤𝑛𝑛 − 𝑞𝑡
𝐷𝑢𝑝𝑛 } = 0ts    Eq. 9 
 
 
4. Input data 
 
 Firstly, the composition of the studied system is discussed. Two distribution networks are 
considered, feeder I and feeder II. Fig. 4 shows feeder I, a 12-node straight-line radial 
distribution feeder. Fig. 5 shows feeder II, a 24-node radial network with branches. In these 
figures, the white triangles represent the connected households and the sun symbolizes the 
presence of a roof PV installation. Both of the feeders are assumed to be lossless circuits with 
identical impedance between the different nodes. The choice of input parameters of this system 
are discussed and motivated in the remainder of this subsection.  
  
Fig. 4. 12-node straight radial distribution network (feeder I) 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. 24-node radial distribution network with branches (feeder II) 
 
 Several sources were consulted to obtain data on the characteristics of the power 
consumption, PV profiles and prices. First, the data on the power consumption of the households 
have been retrieved from the website of Synergrid (Synergrid, 2015). The synthetic load profiles 
published by Synergrid, are the average consumptions of the Belgian households. Please refer to 
Fig. A.1 of annex I. Second, the PV profiles have been retrieved, using a toolbox developed by 
NREL (NREL, 2015) and they are illustrated in Fig. A.2 in annex I. Finally, the price sequence has 
been retrieved from the BELPEX platform (BELPEX, 2015). To view the pricing profile, please 
refer to Fig. A.3 of annex I. As it has been outlined also in the previous section, the wholesale 
price, Pt, has been considered and dynamic pricing has been assumed. Currently, most 
consumers purchase fixed-price energy contracts and hence price volatility is not reflected in 
their energy bills (Dupont, De Jonghe, Olmos, & Belmans, 2014). In such a case it would not be 
possible to estimate the savings incurred by price differences. A weekly price profile has been 
used for the purposes of the empirical test of the proposed model. 
 In this study, the demand flexibility is modeled as a percentage of the total demand at each 
of the time intervals. Considering different works that have been carried out in the level of 
appliances (Woon, Aung, & Madnick, 2014), (Tahersima, Madsen, & Andersen, 2013), the flexible 
demand can represent a percentage varying largely from 2% up to more than 20%. An average 
demand flexibility coefficient of 10% is considered here. However, in the sensitivity analysis a 
wide range of demand flexibility coefficient is considered to cover different scenarios.   
 During the calibration of the model, capacities were assigned to the lines in such a way that 
congestion occurs and hence a comparative study, flexibility versus physical expansion, could be 
performed. As it is evident also in Fig. A.4 in annex I the initial capacity of all lines of both 
feeders I and II is set at 8 kW. An average cost of the physical network expansion of €6000/kW 
has been considered. This indicative cost is an estimate, considering average costs and distances 
of distribution networks that have been found in the literature (Hau, 2013), (Shirley, 2001). 
Since in practice the actual cost may defer significantly, a sensitivity analysis is carried out 
considering different values of this parameter.   
 Concerning the value of the ROI, the rate of 10% has been selected. Based on historical data, 
(CSI Market, 2015), a ROI of 10.83% has been achieved in the energy sector. The current ROI is 
settled at the rate of 5.58%, but since it is subject to fluctuations, the use of the historical average 
has been preferred to avoid high specificity. The developed model offers the possibility to 
modify the ROI to adhere to the specifics of an applicable region or period. 
 
 
5. Results and discussion 
  
 This section provides a summary of the results of the empirical testing. The input data 
presented in the previous section, have been used to demonstrate how the developed 
optimization model works. A sensitivity analysis on the input parameters is also included for   
the purpose of verifying how the results can defer given different circumstances. The results are 
presented alongside comments and clarifications when necessary. The final section of this 
chapter contains a summary of the results, as well as, discussion and conclusion on them. 
  In Fig. 6, the distribution of the costs for the DSO is presented corresponding to feeders I 
and II respectively. The case where demand flexibility is used is printed in the upper subplots. At 
the end of the planning period, it can be seen that the total cost of the DSO is reduced when 
demand flexibility is utilized. It can be seen that the price benefit incurred by demand shifting 
for the consumers is rather small in both feeders and that is a reason that the supplementary 
payment is quite high. When, no flexibility is used, the total cost is entirely composed by the 
expenses for physical expansions.  Curtailment of the PV output occurs in feeder II only for the 
case when no demand flexibility is used. In the same feeder, the supplementary payment 
(flexibility cost) payable by the DSO to the consumers, constitutes only the 3.6% of the total 
costs of the DSO, which makes the use of flexibility particularly effective in cost minimization as 
capital expenses are reduced by almost 22%.  
 
 
Fig. 6. Comparison of the monetary indicators for feeder I (left) and feeder II (right), with the use of demand flexibility 
(up) and only with physical expansions (down). The price benefit saved by the consumers is also listed as it is 
partially determining the supplementary payment (flexibility cost) that is payable by the DSO to the consumers.   
 
 
Fig. 7. Planned distribution line capacity expansions for feeder I (left) and feeder II (right), with the use of demand 
flexibility (up) and only with physical expansions (down).  
  
 The DSO cost reduction is due to the reduction of the cost for physical expansions, 
mentioned as capex. This can be evident in Fig. 7. In the same figure, it can be noticed that 
indeed the use of demand flexibility can reduce the need for physical expansions in the 
distribution grids. For the case of feeder I, the reduction in capacity incremental reinforcement 
in all lines is reduced by almost 90%, and for feeder II, the reduction reaches up to 22%. Another 
observation is that the nodes connected closer to the feeding point in a radial network are more 
vulnerable to notice congestion in their links between them. Hence, it might be beneficial to 
incentivize such nodes to increase their flexibility potential further.     
 In Table 2, a summary of the different monetary and capacity indicators for feeder I and II 
is given. Monetary indicators include the expenses for physical grid investments, namely CAPEX, 
the cost for curtailing part of the PV output, the price benefit and the additional supplement for 
the customers, and the benefit for the DSO. The capacity indicators include the volume of the 
required physical expansions, the curtailment and the dispatched demand flexibility. Based on 
both cost and capacity indicators a flexibility price per kWh is calculated and given.  
 
Table 2 
Summary of monetary and capacity indicators for feeders I and II, given in percentages by comparing the cases of 
using demand flexibility and of relying entirely on physical expansions. 
 
Monetary Indicators 
Feeders 
Feeder I Feeder II 
% reduction of CAPEX with 
the use of flexibility 
-88.74% -21.85% 
% price benefit on consumer 
earnings 
0.8% 0.75% 
% flexibility contracting cost 
on total DSO cost 
84.38% 3.63% 
% DSO total cost reduction 
with the use of flexibility 
27.91% 18.89% 
Capacity indicators   
% reduction of line 
expansions with the use of 
flexibility 
-88.81% -21.43% 
% reduction of curtailment 
with the use of flexibility 
- -100%2 
Flexibility price   
Price 10.64 €/kWh 10.75 €/kWh 
 
 
 The positive effect of the flexibility is the reduction in the cost of physical expansions. That 
effect is noted in both feeders I and II, as observed on Table 2. The price paid by the DSO to the 
prosumers for this positive effect of flexibility equals the supplement, the cost of guaranteeing 
the prosumers a fixed benefit. In both cases, the cost has been estimated in the vicinity of 10 
€/kWh. The savings in expansion cost are larger than the supplement and result therefore in 
overall cost reduction for the DSO. 
 Moreover, in feeder II, flexibility worked very positively on preventing any curtailments on 
the PV output. As it has been stated in the hypothesis of this paper, demand flexibility can 
facilitate the increasing penetration of RES in the grid; the scenario of feeder II demonstrates 
this capability. 
 Finally, a sensitivity analysis was carried out on the main input parameters. These 
parameters include the percentage of the electricity consumption regarded flexible, namely the 
flexibility coefficient, the costs for line capacity expansions, the power consumption, the 
electricity price, the output of the PV installations and the ROI rate. For each of the input 
parameters variations from -50% to +50%, in other words from 50% to 150%, with a step of 
5%, of the initial values described in section 4 are inserted to the model, considering feeder I. 
Table 3 presents the ranges of the values of the parameters that have been considered in the 
sensitivity analysis. The comparative figures produced by the sensitivity analysis are plotted 
across these variations, referred to as sensitivity coefficient of the concerned parameter. To 
avoid having an overwhelming number of figures in this section, the figures about flexibility 
coefficient, capacity expansion cost per unit and ROI are plotted here and the rest are included in 
annex I. In each figure, the expansions costs with and without flexibility as well as the cost to 
contract flexibility are presented. That allows to examine how a variation of the parameters 
affect the magnitude of the benefits that flexibility can offer to a DSO with respect to investment 
cost minimization.   
   
Table 3 
Ranges of values of the parameters on which sensitivity analysis was performed. For power consumption, price and 
PV output the peak values are given as an indication, as these parameters contain sequence of data and not scalar 
values as the rest.   
 
Parameter 
Sensitivity coefficient 
50% 
(minimum) 
100% 
(initial input) 
150% 
(maximum) 
Flexibility 
coefficient 
5% 10% 15% 
Capacity expansion 
cost per unit 
3000 €/kW 6000 €/kW 9000 €/kW 
Power consumption 
(peak) 
0.375 kW 0.75 kW 1.125 kW 
Price (peak) 0.14 €/kWh 0.28 €/kWh  0.42 €/kWh 
PV output (peak) 0.85 kW 1.7 kW 2.55 kW 
ROI 5% 10% 15% 
                                                          
2 Please refer to Fig. A.5 in annex I to observe the comparison of the performance of the capacity 
indicators, namely, the necessary line expansion, the curtailment and the amount of the mobilized demand 
flexibility. 
 
 As observed on Fig. 8, in the scenario where the flexible demand comprise the 12% of the 
total consumption (at 120% of the sensitivity coefficient), all physical expansions would have 
been avoided, bringing the respective cost to 0, maximizing the cost savings for the DSO, to over 
€3000 in total. On the contrary, for flexibility shares of 6% of the total consumption or lower, the 
contracting of flexibility would be more costly than simply expanding the lines. The cost for 
contracting flexibility remains stable at €4978.70, since it is based on the ROI rate and cost for 
installing flexibility – associated equipment. 
 Fig. 9 illustrates how the cost savings for DSO thicken as expansion costs grow more than 
the nominal value. On the contrary, savings deteriorate as physical grid expansions become 
cheaper. At an expansion cost of €3600 per kW, only the costs for contracting flexibility alone 
exceed the costs for physical expansion. When no flexibility is considered, the required physical 
expansions are more intensive, hence the respective cost (blue) tends to increase at a rather 
higher rate, compared to the case where flexibility is used. For the cases where increased line 
expansion costs are expected, contracting flexibility at the predefined fixed rate might be a good 
solution to keep DSO expenses lower. 
 Fig. 10 depicts the impact of variations of the ROI rate on the DSO cost reductions. Since the 
flexibility costs are associated to the installation costs and the ROI rate, obviously, a higher ROI 
rate can will result in larger costs for contracting flexibility. Hence, the cost savings for the DSO 
will be less when compared to scenarios of lower ROI rates. Even at a ROI rate of 15% (150% of 
the initial value), still it would be beneficial to contract flexibility instead of only expanding the 
lines. 
 Variations of the power consumption affect the expansion and flexibility costs in a trivial 
manner, whilst variations of the wholesale prices and the PV output have no effect on the 
resulting costs. Please refer to Fig. A.6, Fig. A.7 and Fig. A.8 in annex I to observe the respective 
figures.        
 
Fig. 8. Sensitivity on the % of flexible demand – Total expansion cost without demand flexibility (blue), with demand 
flexibility (red) and for contracting flexibility (black). 
 
Fig. 9. Sensitivity on line capacity expansion cost – Total expansion cost without demand flexibility (blue), with 
demand flexibility (red) and for contracting flexibility (black).  
 
Fig. 10. Sensitivity on ROI rate – Total expansion cost without demand flexibility (blue), with demand flexibility (red) 
and for contracting flexibility (black). 
 
As summarized on Table 4: 
 More demand flexibility, i.e. higher flexibility coefficient, is better. DSO savings are 
seeing an increase as the percentage of flexible demand is growing, whilst expansions 
are kept low.  
 The costs for physical expansions have a negative impact on the DSO savings, as 
expected.  
 Variations of the ROI rate affect positively consumers’ benefits and negatively the DSO 
savings. 
 
  Table 4 
  Sensitivity analysis – impact of the parameters on DSO savings, consumer benefit and line capacity  
  expansions. 
 
Parameter DSO savings 
Consumer 
benefit 
Capacity 
Expansions 
Flexibility coefficient 
Hi  ++  ++ 
Low --  -- 
Capacity expansion 
cost per unit 
Hi  --   
Low ++   
Power consumption 
Hi  +  -- 
Low -  ++ 
Price 
Hi     
Low    
PV output 
Hi     
Low    
ROI 
Hi  - +  
Low + -  
 
 
6. Conclusions and policy implications 
 
 Flexibility is a necessary helps deal with congestion issues in a power system. The 
increasing trends of small-scale distributed generation, intermittent RES and EVs among others, 
dictate this necessity even more. Due to increasing intermittency and uncontrollability, 
generation-side flexibility becomes scarce. This paper highlights and examines the possible 
contribution of demand-side flexibility in distribution grids congestion management. To tackle 
the topic, both a conceptual and  an empirical framework have been developed, namely 
FlexMart. The modeling framework investigates whether the use of demand flexibility can defer 
or limit the physical expansions of the lines of local distribution grids. 
 As illustrated in the previous section, depending on the grid parameters, it is possible that 
contracting demand flexibility might limit the need for physical expansions of the lines. Such an 
investment deferral can allow the DSO to reduce  costs and consumers to reduce their energy 
bills. Hence, a regulatory framework that allows DSO to contract the domestic demand flexibility 
might be beneficial for both parties, DSO and consumers. Furthermore, it might be beneficial to 
give DSOs the incentive to avoid capital-intensive expansions and turn to innovative methods for 
congestion management, such as the use of demand flexibility.   
 The proposed way to bridge the DSO and the consumers is through the AUs. The direct 
cooperation between the two parties would not be realistic. Transaction costs, required time 
and personnel to facilitate the process, indicate the need for an intermediary entity which can 
aggregate the flexibility capabilities of several consumers and offer them to the DSO. Due to a 
limited number of market actors and liquidity in local markets, AUs are considered as non-profit 
entities in this work. Within a realistic regulatory framework, AUs could be formed and managed 
by a consortium of concerned stakeholders, including local authorities, utilities and consumers.    
 This paper suggests also a fixed and risk-free flexibility remuneration mechanism. A shift of 
the consumers’ demand from an hour to another might induce a price benefit. It is proposed that 
a fair benefit for the consumers should be to recover their investment costs in flexibility-related 
equipment incremented by the ROI rate. The DSO, in other words the beneficiary of the 
flexibility, is responsible to cover the difference between the incremented investment costs of 
the consumers and their price benefit. Such a mechanism can empower consumers to participate 
in flexibility schemes by limiting their risk to a minimum. A shift to dynamic energy pricing on 
the retail level would serve this purpose. Fixed price-volume retail energy contracts and this 
remuneration mechanism would be incompatible. 
 The model developed in this paper has the ability to calculate the optimal combination of 
physical grid expansions, demand flexibility dispatch and curtailment of the PV installations 
output. As the previous section demonstrated, for a given network configuration and 
parameters, the empirical model returns the required expansion, the schedule of dispatched 
flexibility and curtailment throughout the planning period. Additionally, the model provides an 
indicative price per unit of flexibility and quantifies the benefits for the DSO and the consumers 
concerned. The model can be used by utilities, regional and city planners and policy makers, as a 
decision support and screening tool.  
 
 
Acknowledgement  
 
I would like to cordially thank my dear friend and colleague, Sander Claeys for his valuable 
feedback, insights and continuous support. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Annex I 
 
 
 
 
- Fig. A.1. The average Belgian daily household consumption per season (source Synegrid).  
 
 
Fig. A.2. The power output of an average Belgian roof PV of 4kW installation per season (source: PVWatts). 
 
 
  
Fig. A.3. Average daily electricity price (source: BELPEX).  
 
Fig. A.4. Instances of the power flow over the lines (blue dots) and the initial line capacities before any expansions 
(red) for feeder I (left) and feeder II (right), with the use of demand flexibility (up) and only with physical expansions 
(down).     
 
Fig. A.5. Comparison of the capacity indicators for feeder I (left) and feeder II (right), with the use of demand 
flexibility (up) and only with physical expansions (down).    
 
 
Fig. A.6. Sensitivity on power consumption – Expansion cost without demand flexibility (blue), with demand 
flexibility (red) and cost for contracting flexibility (black). 
 
 
 
Fig. A.7. Sensitivity on electricity price – Expansion cost without demand flexibility (blue), with demand flexibility 
(red) and cost for contracting flexibility (black). 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. A.8. Sensitivity on PV Output – Expansion cost without demand flexibility (blue), with demand flexibility (red) 
and cost for contracting flexibility (black).  
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